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ABSTRACT
This  paper  looks  at  the  effect  of  credit  constraints  on  skill  acquisition  when  agents  have
heterogeneous abilities and wealth. We use a two factor general equilibrium model and assume credit
markets are absent. We explore the effects of trade on factor earnings as well as the evolution of the
distribution of income in small and large economies. Our work suggests that developed countries
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W h a ti st h er o l eo fc r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t si nt r a n s ferring skills across generations and what is
t h er o l eo ft r a d ei nt h i s ? W h a ti st h ee ﬀect of tighter credit constraints? Will welfare
rise or fall and why? These are the questions addressed in this paper. They are clearly
of immense relevance for policy since human capital is not good collateral for loans and
the ability to acquire skills can be severely limited by wealth. In this paper we assume
credit markets are absent, but consider two settings with diﬀerent degrees of credit market
imperfections. In the ﬁr s to n e ,c r e d i tm a r k e t sa r ec o m p l e t e l ya b s e n ta n dt h eo n l yw a ya n
agent can acquire skills is by paying for training in full up front. This is clearly an extreme
case. In the second setting we allow credit constraints to be weakened through a pay as
you go system. This can be interpreted as an apprenticeship contract where training is
provided in exchange for services. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a form of work
study. For example, most Ph.D. students in the U.S. have their education paid for and
obtain a stipend in return for teaching or research services. Many undergraduates ﬁnance
at least part of their education through work study programs.
An alternative way of acquiring skills is through ﬁrms, rather than workers, incurring
these costs. There is a fairly large literature that models such contracts. It deals with issues
such as which labor market imperfections would make ﬁrms pay for general training that is
transferable across ﬁrms, the features of such contracts and their rationale, the ineﬃciency
of training levels provided by ﬁrms, as well as the success of such apprenticeship programs
in providing a skilled labor force.2
Such issues are not the subject of this paper. Rather, we focus on another, hitherto
unstudied aspect of apprenticeships, namely their ability to help circumvent credit con-
straints. Those with the skills to impart (masters) enter into a contract with the unskilled
(apprentices) to “teach as best they know” their technical skills. In return, the apprentice
undertakes the tasks assigned to him by the master for the (speciﬁed) period of his appren-
ticeship. He is paid below market wages during this period, receiving payment in the form
2For a review of this research, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) and Smits and Stromback (2001).
1of training instead.3 Contrast this with the alternative where the training fees have to be
paid up front. In the absence of credit markets, only those with the wealth to pay the up
front fee could aﬀord training. Note however, that even if part of the fee is paid up front,
as occurs when the apprentice’s wage is negative, the less well oﬀ m a yb ea b l et oa ﬀord the
apprenticeship (work study) route.
A r ec r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t si m p o r t a n ti nt h eU . S .t o d a y ? I ti sw e l lu n d e r s t o o dt h a ti n t e r -
generational income correlation is reasonably high.4 Empirical work on college attendance
has consistently shown that parental income does predict college attendance and that the
eﬀect on college attendance of tuition is greater for lower income families. Should these
facts be taken as evidence of credit constraints? Recent work by Cameron and Heckman
(1998) questions such an interpretation of these facts. They estimate decision rules for
college attendance that control for family background measures like parents education,
family income at 16, and a measure of the child’s skill endowment as proxied for by the
Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). They ﬁnd that family income is not signiﬁcant
which they interpret as evidence that credit constraints are not binding. They argue that
such correlations could arise in the absence of credit constraints at the college level: for
example, parental wealth could be correlated to the skill endowment of the children5 or
school could have a consumption value so that higher parental incomes result in more
education directly.
Keane and Wolpin (2001) argue that credit constraints do matter. They estimate a
3Lane (1996) shows that in late 18th century, apprentices earned 41% of the journeyman (skilled) rate
while unskilled workers earned 77%. In some cases, apprentices have even paid for the privilege of learning
the trade. In fact, by the 18th century, an up front fee had become the norm. While there was considerable
v a r i a t i o ni nt h et e r m ss p e c i ﬁed between the country and the city as well as across occupations, there were
instances of large sums, hundreds of pounds, being paid up front when the trade was particularly well
rewarded.
4Solon (1992) ﬁnds a ballpark ﬁgure of .4. Charles and Hurst (2003) ﬁnd the pre-bequest correlation in
log wealth to be .37.
5This may well be a reﬂection of credit constraints or diﬀerences in the importance given to schooling
by parents long before college!
2structural model and argue that though borrowing constraints are tight, they are mitigated
by agents adjusting labor supply. This is why changes in tuition aﬀect college attendance
by relatively little, and have a greater eﬀect on poorer families who are likely to be more
constrained by their labor supply. See Keane (2002) for a simple and clear summary of the
issues here.
We develop a simple general equilibrium model where apprenticeships help overcome
credit constraints that limit the ability of agents with heterogeneous abilities and wealth
to acquire skills. There are two tradable ﬁnal goods, and two factors, unskilled labor and
skilled labor which is produced using skilled labor and unskilled labor.
In the static version of our model,6 the response of supply to price depends on the
number of skilled agents in the economy. If there are relatively few skilled agents, the normal
supply response obtains. However, with many skilled agents, supply can be decreasing in
price so that multiple equilibria may exist. The intuition is that in addition to the normal
supply response, there is an induced Rybczynski eﬀect which could work in either direction.
When there are relatively few skilled agents, an increase in the price of the skill-intensive
good, keeping as given expected future prices, raises the cost of education. This reduces the
number of agents who want to acquire training and thus raises the availability of unskilled
labor. The availability of skilled labor for production also rises as less skilled labor is
needed in training. Whether relative availability of skilled labor rises or falls depends on
the endowment of skilled workers to begin with: if this endowment is large, the relative
availability of skilled labor falls, while if it is small, it rises. In the former case, relative
supply of the skill-intensive good can fall with price, while in the latter case it must rise.
Simple general equilibrium intuition would suggest that weaker credit constraints would
raise the availability of skilled labor shifting the relative supply of the skill-intensive good a
la Rybczynski, and lowering its relative price in autarky. However, our induced Rybczynski
eﬀect can work in the opposite direction. Relaxing credit constraints increases the number
of agents who try to become educated at any given price. This, in turn, reduces both
6In a static setting expectations about future prices are taken as given.
3the skilled and unskilled labor available for production. If the stock of skilled agents is
relatively large, then the percentage fall in skilled labor will be low relative to that of
unskilled labor so that the relative availability of skilled labor in production rises and the
relative supply of the skill-intensive good shifts out. The opposite occurs when the stock
of skilled agents is small. As a result, weaker credit constraints can result in a higher price
of the skill-intensive good contrary to what simple intuition might suggest.
In steady state, however, non monotonicity of supply and multiplicity of equilibria occur
only in the presence of credit constraints. An increase in the price in steady state raises the
return to skilled labor today, and hence, the cost of education, but it also raises the return
tomorrow. While the increase in the cost of education reduces the demand for training,
the increase in the return tomorrow increases it. Since each agent must be able to train
more than one worker for there to be skilled workers present in steady state, the latter
eﬀect dominates. Thus, an increase in price raises the number of trainees, reducing the
availability of unskilled workers for production. In steady state, and in the absence of
credit constraints, as the number of trainees rises, so does the number of skilled workers
available for production. As a result, an increase in price raises the relative supply of
the skill-intensive good. In the presence of credit constraints, relative supply need not be
monotonic in price. For relative supply to be backward bending, the increase in education
cost resulting from an increase in price must constrain enough of the potential pool of
trainees.
In steady state, weaker credit constraints always raise the relative supply of the skill-
intensive good and lower its autarky relative price. Weaker credit constraints raise the
demand for training, thus reducing the availability of unskilled labor in production. How-
ever, as the number of trainees rise, so does the availability of skilled labor for production
and hence relative supply of the skill-intensive good.
There may or may not be multiple equilibria in steady state with credit constraints:
a key determinant is the distribution of wealth. With such multiplicity, trade may even
reduce welfare in steady state if (a) there is limited substitutability in consumption and
4(b) the value of ﬁnal good output evaluated at traded prices falls.
Related Literature Our work is related to the literature on endogenous skill forma-
tion in international trade. In an inﬂuential contribution, Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)
extend the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model by endogenizing the formation of human cap-
ital. They show that trade ampliﬁes initial diﬀerences in factor endowments through the
Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect: trade raises the reward of the abundant factor in each country.
Cartiglia (1997) incorporates credit constraints into a Findlay-Kierzkowski type model,
but uses a static setting. He shows that, trade should lead to convergence in human
capital endowments across countries rather than ampliﬁcation of initial diﬀerences. Trade
liberalization in a skill-scarce country while reducing the return to education, also reduces
the cost of education which weakens credit constraints, resulting in a higher investment
in human capital. This eﬀect, in fact, outweighs the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect of Findlay-
Kierzkowski, reversing their results.7
The work of Ranjan (2001) is closest to our work. He also allows for borrowing con-
straints to aﬀect human capital accumulation in small open economy with two traded ﬁnal
goods. Lenders can lend at the world rate of interest, while borrowers can only borrow up
till an incentive compatible repayment level. This level is higher for more able agents, i.e.,
for agents who obtain more eﬀective units of skilled labor upon becoming educated. He
points out a third eﬀect that operates through changes in the distribution of income which
inﬂuences the accumulation of human capital and shows that under certain conditions,
trade may encourage skill acquisition in both countries.
His work diﬀers from ours in a number of ways. First, we derive a new eﬀect, the
induced Rybczynski eﬀect that helps understand how price increases and diﬀerences in
extent to which credit constraints operate aﬀect the relative supply of the skill-intensive
good in the static model. The diﬀerences in the extent of credit constraints are modelled
as being institutional in nature: namely, whether education has to be paid for up front or
c a nb ep a i df o ra sy o ug o .
7A similar result obtains in Eicher (1999) via a domestic credit market.
5S e c o n d ,w el o o ka tb o t ha u t a r k ya n dt r a d e ,s t a t i ca n ds t e a d ys t a t ee ﬀects, positive and
normative eﬀects, rather than restrict attention to the operation of a small open economy
in steady state as in Ranjan (2001). We are able to provide simple conditions under which
trade reduces welfare. Our work has the policy implication that unless developed countries
ensure access to education when liberalizing trade, they may well lose their comparative
advantage in it and end up losing from trade in steady state.
Third, our model is set up slightly diﬀerently from his which permits us to do more in
terms of analyzing the eﬀects on the distribution of income. We assume that diﬀerences
in ability are reﬂected in the probability of becoming skilled, not the quantity of skills
acquired.8
Ranjan (2003) looks at the eﬀect of trade liberalization on skill acquisition, the skilled-
unskilled wage diﬀerential, and the distribution of wealth. Multiple steady state equilibria
also exist in his model and he shows that trade may induce convergence to the good
equilibria. However, his focus in on trade in intermediate goods as his single ﬁnal good is
not traded.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3
analyzes the equilibrium in the static model and in steady state. It looks at steady state
equilibria and how they diﬀer from the static equilibria in a closed economy. Section 4
studies how trade aﬀects welfare. Section 5 endogenizes the distribution of income. Section
6 provides concluding remarks and directions for future research. Details of the proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two goods, X and Z, and one basic factor, unskilled labor in the economy.
Unskilled labor can be transformed into its skilled counterpart by a skilled worker. However,
if K unskilled workers are taken on by a skilled worker then only G(K) units of the skilled
worker’s time remains available to him, where G(K) is a decreasing function of K.W e
8This simpliﬁes the problem in a number of ways.
6assume that
G(K)=1− AK
so that there are constant returns to scale as A is the time required per trainee.
We assume that there are constant returns to scale in production and that good Z is
relatively more skill-intensive than good X at all factor prices. Good X is the numeraire.
Hence, p denotes the relative price of good Z.
We use an overlapping generations framework. There are L agents born in each period.
Each agent lives for two periods and is endowed with one unit of time in each period. An
agent is characterized by two parameters: γ, the probability of becoming skilled (a master),
upon undertaking the needed education, and y, his initial wealth. It is assumed that γ is
distributed uniformly in the unit interval (γ ∼ U [0,1]).
In the ﬁrst period of life an agent makes career choices. He could remain an unskilled
worker, work in both periods at the unskilled wage, w. Alternatively, he could spend part
of his time acquiring the skills that give him a chance at becoming a master and allowing
him, if he so chooses and is successful in his training, to earn the skilled wage in the second
period. Agents who try to become skilled but fail can work only as unskilled workers in
the second period. Skilled workers could also choose to work as unskilled workers were it
in their interests to do so.
We assume that agents consume only at the end of their lifetimes and have identical











where cX is the consumption of good X, cZ is the consumption of good Z,a n db is bequests
which are modelled as a “warm glow” from giving. In the early part of the paper we neglect
b,i ne ﬀect setting θ =0as we keep the distribution of wealth ﬁxed. We assume that
yt = bt+1 is distributed according to distribution function F(·) in [0,y max],w h e r eymax is
the maximal wealth level. Then, optimal consumption of each good is a linear function of
lifetime income, Y :
cX = δY, cZ =( 1− δ)Y,
72.1 The Earnings of the Skilled
We study two training systems. In the ﬁrst, which we interpret as an apprenticeship system,
or “Pay-As-You- Go” (PAYG) system, payment for training is not made completely up
front. An apprentice supplies β hours of his time to the master at a wage wA and spends
1 − β of his time studying. If a master takes on K apprentices he obtains βK units of
unskilled labor at cost wAβK but has to spend AK hours of his own time in training them.
In the second system, called the “Pay Up Front” (PUF) system, unskilled workers pay the
master a fee, wC, up-front. The training takes 1 − β units of their time and they work for
the remaining time as unskilled workers.
There are no credit markets, so agents cannot borrow. Hence, each agent has to ﬁnance
any up-front costs only from his wealth, which comes from bequests. When fees must be
paid up front, agents with high ability but low initial wealth are barred from becoming
skilled. In the apprenticeship system, credit constraints are less binding. In this manner
we explore the implications of apprenticeship as a way of relaxing credit constraints. We
set up the problems under the two systems. In either setting, a master can hire himself out
and earn the wage of a skilled worker or set up shop and produce. In this latter event, they
could hire unskilled labor and/or train unskilled workers, who, in return, work part of their
time at below market wages and/or pay to be trained. Each apprentice spends (1 − β) of
h i st i m es t u d y i n ga n dw o r k st h er e s to ft h et i m ea sa nu n s k i l l e dw o r k e r .U n s k i l l e dw o r k e r s
are paid wage wt and apprentices are paid wA
t , which may be positive or negative. If wA
t is
positive then we say that credit constraints do not operate as anyone who wishes to become
an apprentice can do so. If wA
t is negative then unskilled workers must pay masters. Only
those who have suﬃcient initial wealth to do so have the option of becoming apprentices
and we say that credit constraints operate. However, in both cases, trainees can pay, in
part at least, as they go along.
In each period of time there are Mt masters who are the successful trainees from the
last period. Since there are constant returns to scale in training and production, under the
PAYG system, each skilled worker (master) must maximize value of proﬁts he can obtain by
8setting himself up in business. But as long as training occurs, this must be the opportunity
cost of his time as a teacher. A skilled worker who chooses only to train workers and sell










Under the PUF system, trainees pay the master tuition, wC
t , and spend (1 − β) hours of
their time learning skills. In addition, they can work as unskilled workers β hours of their
time and earn βwt. Each skilled worker must earn the opportunity cost of his time as a
teacher. A master can earn wC











3.1 Static Autarky Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the autarky equilibrium in each period t. First, we describe
equilibrium under the PAYG system and then under the PUF system. Then we argue that
if the two coexist, it is equivalent to having the PAYG system as it dominates.
3.1.1 The PAYG System







proportion of agents who become apprentices is denoted by (1 − ˜ γt).
Since both goods are essential in the consumption, both goods must be produced in





9The price of Z equals its cost,







This pins down wt and wS
t , and hence wA
t , (from equation (1)) for a given pt. From (3) and
(4) we know that since Z is skill-labor intensive, as pt rises, wS
t rises and wt falls. This is
just the Stolper Samuelson Theorem.
Now it is obvious that for a given pt, we will obtain the same wS
t in both the PAYG






t at a given pt.
From (1) it is easy to see that as pt rises wA
t falls more than wt for wS
t to rise.
Occupational Choice A young agent in period t, has two options. The ﬁrst is to work
both periods of his life as unskilled worker. This gives a lifetime income of 2wt. The second
option is to invest in skills hoping to become a master. The expected lifetime income in
this case equals βwA
t + γEtwS
t+1 +( 1− γ)wt. Let ˜ γt denote the agent who is indiﬀerent







t+1 +( 1− ˜ γt)wt,
or
















where the second equality follows from (1).
Agents with γ ∈ [0, ˜ γt], work both periods of their life as unskilled workers, while agents
with γ ∈ [˜ γt,1], would like to be apprentices. As expected, higher proﬁts for masters today,
i.e., lower wages for apprentices today, raises ˜ γt — fewer agents become apprentices. If the





) rises, i.e., the expected apprentice’s wage












10Equilibrium Since each agent spends a ﬁxed share of his income on the consumption of












t are the aggregate demands for good X and good Z respectively.
Obtaining the supply of X and Z is slightly more complicated. For a given level of
expected proﬁts, EtwS
t+1, and a given number of masters, the supply of X and Z at any
pt can be derived as follows. For each price, we get wS
t ,w A
t ,w t. These determine ˜ γt which
gives the set of agents who want to become skilled. The intersection of this set with the
set of agents who have wealth above wA
t , determines how many agents are both willing and
able to become apprentices. Removing the skilled labor needed for training them from the
stock of masters gives the supply of skilled labor available for production, LS
t . Adding those
who choose to become unskilled workers today to the inherited stock of unskilled workers
(which includes both those who chose to become unskilled yesterday and those who failed
at becoming skilled) and unskilled labor supplied by apprentices today, gives the supply of
unskilled labor available for production, LU
t .
The availability of skilled and unskilled labor for production then gives the size of the
standard Rybczynski box and relative supply. Hence, every price pt corresponds to a point
on the relative supply curve which is illustrated in Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b). Price p1
corresponds to wS
t = wt. W h e np r i c ei sb e l o wp1, the return to skilled labor is less than
the wage of unskilled worker, as a result the option of working as unskilled worker is more
proﬁtable than the option of being a master even for those who are skilled. For all prices
below p1 the supply of each good is zero. At price p1 skilled workers are indiﬀerent between





as we can see from (1), to wA
t =0 . For all prices below p2 the apprentice’s wage is positive,
so credit constraints do not operate and the relative supply is denoted by RSAncc
t .F o r
prices above p2 the apprentice’s wage is negative, i.e., workers pay to become apprentices.
In this event, agents are subject to credit constraints. Relative supply in this region is
denoted by RSAcc
t . When price exceeds p3, given the expected skilled wage tomorrow, the
11apprentice’s wage is so low that the option of investing in skills is dominated and there are
no apprentices (˜ γt =1 ).
Next, we turn to the shape of the relative supply curve and the nature of static equilib-
rium. An equilibrium in which the apprentice’s wage is positive is a non-credit-constrained
(NCC) equilibrium. An equilibrium in which the apprentice’s wage is negative is a credit-
constrained (CC) equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under the PAYG system, if the number of masters in period t is small
enough, i.e., Mt ≤ ˜ M =
2A
(1 + A − β)
, then relative supply is increasing in price. If there
are enough masters, i.e., Mt > ˜ M, then relative supply need not be increasing in price and
multiple equilibria are possible.
A formal proof in the Appendix. We focus on the intuition behind this result here.
Suppose that the price increases. This results in a higher return to skilled labor and in
a lower apprentice’s wage.9 In a static setting, the fall in the apprentice’s wage makes
investing in skills less proﬁtable and ˜ γt increases. Hence, the supply of unskilled labor in
period t rises. As fewer agents wish to be apprentices, masters spend less time training
them and the supply of skilled labor available for production increases. Note that both
skilled and unskilled labor available for production rise so that their relative availability
may rise or fall.
The eﬀects on relative supply of a price change can be decomposed into two parts. First,
there is the standard positive supply response. An increase in the relative price of the skill-
intensive good raises the relative wage of skilled labor a la the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.
This results in substitution away from skilled labor. For given factor supplies, this raises the
relative supply of the skill-intensive good. Second, there is an induced Rybczynski eﬀect:
an increase in the availability of skilled relative to unskilled labor for production purposes
raises the relative supply of the skill-intensive good.
When there are few masters, Mt < ˜ M, then both eﬀects work in the same direction.
Any given increase in ˜ γt that occurs from the price increase releases what amounts to a large
9If the there are credit constraints, this translates into the fee paid by an apprentice going up.
12percentage increase in the supply of skilled labor so that skilled labor becomes relatively
more abundant, and relative supply of Z rises. In this case, relative demand curve can
intersect the relative supply curve at most once: either in its non-credit-constrained part,
or in its credit-constrained part.
If there are many masters, Mt > ˜ M, then the induced Rybczynski eﬀect works in the
opposite direction from the normal supply response. With many masters, the supply of
skilled labor is relatively large. Any change in ˜ γt translates into a small percentage increase
in the supply of skilled labor and, as a result, skilled labor becomes relatively less abundant
and the relative supply of Z may fall! In this case relative supply may be downward sloping
even without credit constraints making multiple equilibria possible. Multiple equilibria in
this static set-up arise from the interaction of credit constraints and prices. When price
is low, so is the return to skilled labor. In this case, the apprentice’s wage is high, there
are no credit constraints and a large fraction of the population becomes apprentices. Since
Mt is large, despite this, there is a lot of skilled labor available for production and output
is high. Since price is low, demand is high and this can be an equilibrium. On the other
hand, if price is high, so is the return to skilled labor and for this, apprentice’s wages are
negative. Credit constraints operate and many agents cannot become apprentices. While
this does free up some skilled labor for production, there is an ample supply of unskilled
workers. Hence the relative supply of skilled workers is low, as is the relative supply of Z.10
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) depict relative supply for the two cases.
3.1.2 The PUF System
An equilibrium in period t is characterized by a vector of prices
¡
pt,w S
t ,w t,w C
t
¢
.A ss h o w n
below, agents with abilities above the cutoﬀ level, ˜ γt, choose to get trained, so that (1 − ˜ γ)
is the proportion of agents who become trainees.
10Note that not all static equilibria are consistent with steady state: for example, if the intersection
occurred at prices above p3, ˜ γ =1and nobody would invest in skills. If there are no masters in period
t+1, then the return to skilled labor would be inﬁnite which is not consistent with expectations or possible
in steady state.
13Occupational Choice ˜ γt is determined from




t+1 +( 1− ˜ γt)wt,
or
˜ γt =m i n
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where the second equality follows from (2).
In both systems the proportion of agents wanting to invest in skills is given by the same









Equilibrium We can use the approach used in the analysis of the PAYG system to derive
t h er e l a t i v es u p p l yh e r e .I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h at when there are few masters, the relative
supply under the PUF system is upward-sloping, but if the number of masters is large then
the relative supply can be downward-sloping.
Proposition 2 Under the PUF system, if Mt ≤ ˜ M then relative supply is increasing in
price and there is a unique equilibrium. If Mt > ˜ M, then relative supply need not be
increasing in price and there may be multiple equilibria.
What can we say about the relative position of relative supply curves under the PUF
system and under the PAYG system? For any price there is a common level of earnings
for skilled labor, wS
t , and corresponding to this, an education cost — the tuition fee, wC
t ,
in the PUF system or the implicit price of β(1 − wA
t ) under the PAYG system. All of the






front in the PAYG system, so that more is always paid up front under the PUF system.
Hence, at any given pt (or, at any wS
t corresponding to this price) a larger proportion of
agents are credit-constrained under the PUF system.
At any given price pt, both systems have the same cutoﬀ level for ability. However,
since credit constraints are stricter in the PUF system, fewer agents can actually become
14trainees, the rest of those who want to do so cannot, and remain unskilled so that the
supply of unskilled workers is larger at any given pt under the PUF system. The smaller
number of trainees under the PUF system requires less skilled labor to train them. As a
result, the skilled labor available for production is also larger under the PUF system. What
can we say about relative availability? As before, when there are few masters the relative
availability of skilled labor is higher under the PUF system, while when there are many
masters the relative availability of skilled labor is lower under the PUF system. Hence, the
eﬀect on relative supply follows from the relative factor availability under the two systems.
If there are few masters, Mt ≤ ˜ M, then at any given pt, t h er e l a t i v es u p p l yo ft h e
skill-intensive good is more than that under the PAYG system. If there are many masters,
Mt > ˜ M, it is less than that in the PAYG system. This is depicted in Figures 2(a) and
2(b).I nF i g u r e2(a) the number of masters is small, and, as a result, the relative supply
curves for both systems are upward-sloping. At any price below p3 (so that the proportion
of agents who invest in skills is positive) the relative supply curve under the PUF system
is to the right of the relative supply curve under the PAYG system. When price is above
p3 there are no agents who invest in skills and the two curves coincide. Therefore, there
is a unique equilibrium in each system, and the equilibrium price under the PUF system
is lower than the equilibrium price under the PAYG system. Since the equilibrium price
is lower under the PUF system, we cannot conclude that the tuition in the PUF system is
higher than the full fee under the PAYG system.
In Figure 2(b) the number of masters is large. The relative supply curve under the PUF
system is to the left of the relative supply curve under the PAYG system. And, as a result,
the equilibrium price in the PUF system is higher. Moreover, as the price is higher and so
is the full fee and hence the up-front education fee under the PUF system.
Proposition 3 summarizes these results.
Proposition 3 At any given pt, relative supply of the skill-intensive good is higher under
the PUF system than that under the PAYG system as long as Mt ≤ ˜ M. As a result, the
equilibrium price is lower than the equilibrium price under the PAYG system. If Mt > ˜ M,
15relative supply of the skill-intensive good is lower under the PUF system than that under
the PAYG system. Consequently, the equilibrium price under the PUF system is higher
than the equilibrium price under the PAYG system.
It is worth noting that if both systems coexist, the outcome is exactly what it would
have been under the PAYG system. The cutoﬀ levels for the two systems cannot diﬀer.11
Suppose both systems coexisted and the cutoﬀ levels (the ˜ γ0s) for the two diﬀered. Then
the payoﬀ from teaching in the two systems would diﬀer and only the system with the
higher payoﬀ would operate.
3.2 Steady State Autarky Equilibrium
In this section we solve for autarky steady state equilibrium.
3.2.1 The PAYG System
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Note that a higher return to skilled labor means a lower apprentice’s wage wA, hence there
is a trade-oﬀ between a higher earnings tomorrow and a lower wage today. But since a fall
in wA raises the earnings of a master in the next period by more than it reduces the wage




11If they are the same, it is equivalent to the PAYG system.
16Note that the relationship between ˜ γ and the return to skilled labor has the opposite
sign from that in the static set-up. In steady state the return to the option of investing
in skills is increasing in wS as explained above. In the static set-up, the master’s earnings
expected in the next period are ﬁxed and agents take into account only the apprentice’s
wage in the current period, and as a higher wS means a lower apprentice’s wage, the return
to the option of investing in skills is decreasing in wS.
Lemma 1 In steady state, ˜ γ>A .
Proof. Using wS =
β
A
(w − wA) we can rewrite the return to the option of investing in
skills as βw+( 1− γ)w + wS (γ − A). Then, for γ<Athis return is clearly less than the
lifetime income of unskilled worker. As proﬁtg o e st oi n ﬁnity (wS →∞ ) the proportion A
of agents work as unskilled labor and (1 − A) become apprentices, i.e., ˜ γ → A.T h e r e f o r e ,
in steady state the proportion of agents who become apprentices never exceeds 1 − A.
Equilibrium Relative demand is standard and depends only on relative price. We can
use the approach used in the static set-up to derive the relative supply here as well which
is depicted in Figure 3. Price p1 corresponds to wS such that γA =1 . For all prices below




and, as in the static set-up, to wA =0 . For all prices below p2 the apprentice’s
wage is positive, so that credit constraints are not binding and relative supply is denoted
by RSAncc. For prices above p2 the apprentice’s wage is negative, and agents are subject to
credit constraints. Relative supply in this region is denoted by RSAcc.
Next, we turn to the shape of the relative supply curve and the nature of steady state
equilibrium. First, we prove that when credit constraints are not operating the relative
supply curve is upward-sloping. Suppose that price rises. Then the return to skilled labor
r i s e sa sw e l l ,a n dt h i sr e s u l t si nl o w e r˜ γ: more agents choose to invest in skills at a higher
price. Since more agents become apprentices, the supply of unskilled labor falls. What can
we say about the supply of skilled labor? Subtracting the skilled labor needed for training
17from the stock of masters gives the supply of skilled labor available for production:
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is the number of masters and K =1 − ˜ γ is the number of
apprentices. As price rises, the number of apprentices increases, as does the number of







(A − ˜ γ) > 0
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1. As a result, via standard Rybczynski argu-
ments, the relative supply of the skill-intensive good rises with p.
When agents are subject to credit constraints, the eﬀects of an increase in price on
the supply of unskilled and skilled labor are ambiguous and depend on the distribution
of wealth. If a higher price results in unskilled labor becoming relatively more abundant,
then the relative supply of the skill-intensive good may fall. If, for example, there are many
agents who become credit-constrained at this higher price, then a large proportion of agents
w h oi n v e s t e di ns k i l l sa tl o w e rp r i c ec a n n o ta ﬀord to do so. Hence, the supply of unskilled
labor rises, and the supply of skilled labor available for production of good Z falls. As a
result, the relative supply of good Z may be lower at this higher price. Thus, when credit
constraints operate, the shape of the relative supply curve depends on the distribution of
wealth and can be either upward-sloping or downward-sloping.
Proposition 4 summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 Under the PAYG system, if p ≤ p2 then credit constraints are not binding
and steady state relative supply is increasing in price. If p>p 2 then credit constraints are
binding, steady state relative supply need not be increasing in price, and multiple steady
state equilibria may exist.
183.2.2 The PUF System
Occupational Choice Following the same procedure as above we can see that ˜ γ is
determined from
2w = −w
C + βw+˜ γw
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As in the PAYG system, a higher return to skilled labor decreases ˜ γ — more agents want
to become trainees.
Equilibrium Since under the PUF system, credit constraints operate at all prices, we
can show the following:
Proposition 5 Under the PUF system steady state relative supply need not be increasing
in price. Multiple steady state equilibria may exist: a key determinant is the distribution
of wealth.
What can we say about the relative position of steady state relative supply curves under
the PUF system and under the PAYG system? At any given price, both systems have the
same cutoﬀ level of ability. However, since credit constraints are stricter in the PUF system,
fewer agents can become trainees, the rest of those who want to do so cannot, and remain
unskilled so that the supply of unskilled workers is larger at any given price under the PUF
system. The smaller number of agents acquiring skills under the PUF system results in a
lower supply of skilled labor available for production in the steady state. As a result, at
a n yp r i c et h es u p p l yo fg o o dZ relative to good X is lower under the PUF system. Figure 3
depicts relative supply curves in both system, where relative supply under the PUF system
is denoted by RSC, relative supply under the PAYG system when credit constraints are
not binding is denoted by RSAncc and when credit constraints are binding by RSAcc.A s
19depicted, relative supply curve under the PUF system is to the left of the relative supply
curve under the PAYG system. And, as a result, the equilibrium price under the PUF
system is higher. Moreover, as the price is higher, so is the full fee and hence the up-front
education fee under the PUF system. This shift out in relative supply of the skill-intensive
good when a country has better credit markets, in combination with better credit markets
raising the mean wealth, drives the result in Ranjan (2001) that at a given price, the
country with better credit markets will export the skill-intensive good.
Proposition 6 summarizes these results. These are in the same spirit as Lemma 1 in
Ranjan (2001) except that here we separate out the eﬀects via the distribution of income.
Proposition 6 At any given p, steady state relative supply is lower under the PUF system
than that under the PAYG system. As a result, the steady state autarky equilibrium price
is higher under the PUF system.
4E ﬀects of Trade
Having described the closed economy, we turn to the analysis of the eﬀects of opening the
economy up to trade. Consider the welfare eﬀects of trade when the country is small and
cannot aﬀect the world price of good Z, denoted by pT.12 Steady state relative supply need
not be increasing in price and multiple equilibria may exist under either system if credit
constraints operate. As we show below, non-monotonicity of relative supply may result in
trade equilibria where the country ends up importing good Z at world prices higher than
its autarky price and, as a result, loses from opening up to trade.
Consider the situation depicted in Figure 4. The relative supply is non-monotonic and
there are two stable steady state autarky equilibria: EA
1 and EA
2 . At equilibrium EA
1 the
price, pA
1 , is low and relative supply of good Z is high, while at EA
2 the price, pA
2 , is high
and supply is low. Suppose that initially the economy is in autarky equilibrium EA
1 . What
12Convergence to steady state will be very quick, limited only by number of masters available to train
the needed skilled labor.
20happens when the country opens up to trade and faces the world price of good Z which is
higher than its autarky price? As the price rises, the earnings of a master rise as well, so
that the option of investing in skills becomes more attractive. As more agents decide to
invest in skills, the up-front education fee goes up. Credit constraints become tighter and
more agents are unable to aﬀord education. Consequently, the supply of the skilled labor
decreases, resulting in lower output of good Z as well as lower relative supply, denoted by
RST. As the price goes up, the relative demand for good Z, denoted by RDT, falls. If a
signiﬁcant proportion of agents becomes credit constrained at this higher price, then the
decrease in relative supply is considerable and exceeds the decrease in relative demand:
opening up to trade allows only few rich agents to invest in skills and, as a result, the
supply of the skill-intensive good falls dramatically and cannot satisfy domestic demand at
this price. Thus, the country imports good Z even though the world price is higher than
the autarky price! Since the country loses its comparative advantage in good Z and has to
import this good at a higher price, the aggregate welfare can be lower with trade.
Proposition 7 provides suﬃcient conditions for welfare to fall with trade when all agents
have identical homothetic preferences so that aggregation is possible.
Proposition 7 Opening up an economy to trade need not be welfare-improving. Aggregate
welfare may fall with trade if a country imports good Z at world prices higher than autarky
price. If substitution in consumption is small enough and if the value of autarkic output at
trade prices exceeds that of the trade output, welfare must fall due to trade.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The outcome in Figure 4 is depicted in Figure 5 in a way that highlights the condition
given above. The production possibility envelope in steady in the presence of credit con-
straints need not have the usual shape: it can be bowed in.13 At pT, and similarly at pA,
there is a given availability of skilled and unskilled labor for production in steady state.
13It must also lie inside the steady state PPF envelope in the absence of credit constraints (which has
the usual bowed out shape as in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)). This makes sense as credit constraints
result in ineﬃciency: the wrong people are trained, which limits production possibilities.
21This deﬁnes the usual PPF at the given price. These PPFs are tangent to their respective
price lines at QT and QA respectively as depicted in Figure 5. The relative demand for
good Z exceeds relative supply at pT b u te q u a l si ta tpA as shown. If there is no substi-
tution in consumption, demand always lies along the ray OA and if as depicted, the line
connecting QT and QA is ﬂatter than pT, t h e nw e l f a r em u s tf a l lw i t ht r a d e . N o t et h a t
limited substitution in consumption is essential: if substitution in consumption is large
enough, say if the indiﬀerence curves are close to being linear so that they are not too far
from the autarky price line, then the result does not go through.
The intuition is simple: when the price of the skill-intensive good rises through trade,
credit constraints are tightened and its relative supply falls. Since the supply of the skill-
intensive good is too low to begin with, the distortion is worsened by trade and welfare falls.
This suggests that developed countries, who presumably have a comparative advantage in
the skill-intensive good, need to ensure access to education to fully reap the gains from
trade.
5 Endogenizing the Distribution of Income
We consider a small open economy. We look ﬁrst at the situation where credit constraints
do not bind and then move on to when they are binding.
5.1 No Credit Constraints
Consider the PAYG system when wA is positive so that there are no credit constraints.
In this case, the income distribution does not aﬀect the equilibrium, but the equilibrium
aﬀects the income distribution so that there is only one way causation. An agent’s total
income, which is allocated across the goods and bequests at the end of his second period of
life is the sum of his bequest, bt, and his earned income. Let Y
j
t (bt) denote this total income
for j = u,f,s since earned income can take only three values, that of unskilled (u),t h e
failed skilled (f), and the skilled (s). The level of these depend on p as this determines wA.
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Note that for a given p, earned income is lowest for the failed skilled and highest for the






means that wA falls and that the fall in wA exceeds the fall in w. Thus, the nominal income
of the unskilled falls as does that of the failures, and so does their real income. Income of
the skilled may increase or decrease depending on p.14
Bequest lines are depicted in Figure 6. Note that there is no way for bequests to exceed
¯ bH or fall below b
L: if all an agent’s ancestors were skilled, the bequest he would get would
be ¯ bH and if all of them were failures, it would be b
L. The bequests that can be made by




while those made by agents of








. Since the bequest line is ﬂatter than the 450 line, the Feller condition is met and
as the distribution of abilities is common across all agents, the Markov process converges
to a unique invariant bequest and associated total income distribution.
To analyze this further, we assume that the intervals deﬁn e da b o v ea r ed i s j o i n ta si n
Figure 6.15 Let pL,p M,p H (for low, middle and high) denote the fraction of agents in steady
state who are in each of these intervals. Then we can calculate the steady state levels of
these variables for given values of ˜ γ for the given distribution of talent, which we take to
be uniform over [0,1]. Thus, we can obtain the steady state distribution of bequests and
wealth at a given p since for each p we get a unique ˜ γ. We can show the following.
Proposition 8 An increase in p raises inequality in the distribution of income in the
absence of credit constraints both because the poor get poorer and the rich richer and because
14Income of skilled decreases if dw < (1 − A)dwA.
15This requires that θ be small enough.
23there are more of them.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Being rich or poor is just a matter of luck with no long term consequences so that one
thinks of inequality as being less pernicious in the above setting.
5.2 Credit Constraints
With credit constraints, there is an additional complication: namely that only the subset of
agents who have bequests over wC, the up front costs of education, can be trained. Suppose
that wC lies between ¯ bL and b
M (Case A). The unskilled are thus all those with ability
below ˜ γ (which have a mass of ˜ γ) as well as those whose parents failed at becoming skilled
but whose γ exceeds ˜ γ (which have a mass of (1− ˜ γ)pL ). Note that with credit constraints,
there is two way causation: not only does the equilibrium aﬀect the income distribution,
but the income distribution aﬀects the equilibrium through the extent of credit constraints.
Let ς(˜ γ)=
¡
1 − ˜ γ2¢
2
denote the expected yield of the successes and let φ(˜ γ)=
(1 − ˜ γ)
2
2
denote the expected yield of failures when the cutoﬀ level is ˜ γ. Then in steady state:
p
L =
















1 − ˜ γ2¢
2
(1 − p
L)=ς(˜ γ)(1 − p
L)
Note that in this instance, the children of the skilled and unskilled are not constrained by
bequests, only the children of the unfortunate failures are. However, since their children
can become skilled, the mixing condition is still met.
Since φ and ς are increasing in p, pL rises, and pM falls, though pH may rise or fall. As
the price rises, the incomes of the skilled rise while that of the unskilled and failures fall.
Proposition 9 An increase in p raises inequality in the distribution of income in the
presence of credit constraints because the poor get poorer and the rich richer but can reduce
inequality to the extent that there are fewer rich in steady state.
24If wC lies between ¯ bM and b
H (Case B) then the children of the unskilled cannot become
skilled and the economy falls into a poverty trap. This can be seen since
p
L = φ(˜ γ)p
H
p




H = ς(˜ γ)p
H
so the only solution is pH = pL =0 .
A non degenerate equilibrium can be restored by perturbing the economy a bit. The
perturbation can be interpreted as the government giving aid by removing the credit con-
straint of a fraction σ of those who are constrained, independent of their ability. This
makes sense since ability need not be easily veriﬁable so that targeting the most able, as
would be eﬃcient, may not be easy. If we do so then we get
p
H = ς(˜ γ)
¡
p




L = φ(˜ γ)
¡
p




M =˜ γ +( 1− p
H)(1− ˜ γ)(1− σ)




1 − σς(˜ γ)
The untalented (˜ γ) as well as the credit constrained talented ((1−pH)(1− ˜ γ)) who do not
get their credit constraints relaxed earn unskilled wages in both periods which explains pM.
The successful able children of parents who earned skilled wages as well as the successful
able children of the rest of the population who had their credit constraints relaxed make
up pH. Their failed able children make up pL. Note that even a small σ moves the economy
away from the poverty trap.
Finally, we ask when inequality might be more pernicious. Here we look at the conse-
quences of a more subtle manifestation of credit constraints. Recall that conditioning on
ability (test scores), income seems to play no role on college attendance. This suggests that
income mainly operates through aﬀecting the ability of children at the time of graduation
25from high school! The poor, one way or the other, seem to not invest as much in their chil-
dren as the rich do. We model this by having the skilled draw from a diﬀerent distribution
of talent, say one which is uniform over [λ,1].
Proposition 10 An improvement in the distributions that the skilled draw from has a
multiplier eﬀect in the steady state distribution of income and of skills. The elasticity of
pH with respect to λ is increasing in λ, suggesting that when the school systems accessed by
the rich and poor diﬀer greatly, we should see very signiﬁcant inequality even if there are
no credit constraints per se.
Proof. In the Appendix.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we develop a model where apprenticeships help overcome credit constraints
that limit the ability of agents with heterogeneous abilities and wealth to acquire skills. We
show that in the static version of our model, under either system, the response of supply
to price depends on the number of skilled agents in the economy. If there are relatively
few skilled agents, the normal supply response obtains. However, with many skilled agents,
supply can be decreasing in price so that multiple equilibria may exist. In steady state,
however, such non monotonicity of supply and multiplicity of equilibrium obtains only in
the presence of credit constraints. Since credit constraints are stricter in the PUF system,
relative supply of the skill-intensive good is always higher, at any given price, under the
apprenticeship system. There may or may not be multiple equilibria in steady state: a key
determinant is the distribution of wealth. Finally, we show that opening the economy to
trade could easily reduce welfare.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . For any price pt we get wages, wS
t and wt,a n dt h er a t i oo f

































for any pt. T h i si sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e s1 ( a )a n d
1 (b), where the supply of skilled labor is on horizontal axis and the supply of unskilled
labor is on vertical axis. The allocation of skilled and unskilled labor between sectors is
at P. Now suppose that price increases. Then the ratio of unskilled to skilled labor in
each sector increases. For ﬁxed endowments of skilled and unskilled labor the outcome is
at P1. It is easy to see that at P1 supply of good Z is higher and supply of good X is lower
compared to P. This is the usual supply response for ﬁxed factor endowments. However,
t h ei n c r e a s ei npt also increases both endowments of skilled and unskilled labor. If the
supply of skilled and the supply of unskilled labor increase proportionately, then given the
assumption that production functions are homothetic outputs of Z and X also increase
proportionately. Hence, from P1 to P2 relative supply does not change.
Figure 1 (a) illustrates the case when change in endowment of skilled labor is propor-
tionately more than the change in the endowment of unskilled labor. In this case, the
‘Rybczynski’ eﬀect works in the same direction as the usual supply eﬀect, moving the equi-
librium to P0. Figure 1 (b) illustrates the case when the change in the endowment of skilled
labor is proportionately less than the change in the endowment of unskilled labor. Now the
‘Rybczynski’ eﬀect works in the opposite direction and tends to decrease relative supply of
good Z. This is shown by P0 being closer to the origin OZ than P2.
Next, we show that whether the change in the endowment of skilled labor is propor-
tionately less or proportionately more than the change in the endowment of unskilled labor
depends on the number of masters Mt.
When credit constraints do not bind the available supplies of skilled and unskilled labor
are
St,ncc = Mt − A(1 − ˜ γt)
27Ut,ncc = β (1 − ˜ γt)+˜ γt +1− Mt
When credit constraints operate the available supplies of skilled and unskilled labor are
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= sign(Mt (1 + A − β) − 2A)
Therefore, if Mt < ˜ M =
2A
(1 + A − β)







/dpt < 0 and the ‘Rybczynski’ eﬀect
works in the same direction as the usual supply response.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . Let e(P,u) be the usual expenditure function. Let p,Q,C,u
denote the price, output and consumption vectors while u denotes utility. The superscripts


















































then e(pT,u T)−e(pT,u A) < 0 so uT <u A. By continuity, if substitution in consumption is
small enough and (10) holds, uT <u A.
Proof of Proposition 8. pM equals the mass of all agents who choose to be unskilled,
or ˜ γ. Similarly, pL must equal the mass of agents who are failures, or
1 R
˜ γ
(1 − γ)dγ,a n dpH
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> 0, so that an increase in p moves
mass from the middle to the tails in the bequest distribution. Note that the location of the
tails themselves will also change as p also aﬀects incomes, and hence Y
j
t (bt).
Proof of Proposition 10. First, consider the case when credit constraints do not bind.
The mass of agents who choose to be unskilled are those with abilities below ˜ γ. The ones
w h oh a v es k i l l e dp a r e n t s ,w h oa r e(pH) of the total in steady state, have a probability µ
˜ γ − λ
1 − λ
¶
of being in the region [λ, ˜ γ] which is less than ˜ γ, that of agents who do not have
skilled parents. Thus, pM is a convex combination of these two probabilities. Those who
choose to try and get trained are those with abilities above ˜ γ. The ones who have skilled
parents, who are (pH) of the total in steady state, have a probability
"







29being in the region [˜ γ,1] while those who do not have skilled parents, who are (1 − pH) of
the total in steady state, have a probability
"













































































































































































32Figure 2 (a): Small Mt.
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